Another Betrayal from Nauru, When Will Lai Snap？
The Storm Media Editorial, January 17, 2024
Immediately following Vice President William Lai’s victory in the presidential election, Nauru announced the termination of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in a lightning-fast manner. This is not the first time for Nauru to do so. When he assumed office in 2000, former President Chen Shui-bian tried every means to reconcile with Beijing until Nauru severed relations with Taiwan in 2002. Mr. Chen then declared the “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” stance, challenging Beijing's bottom line. As the old script of Nauru breaking off diplomatic ties is replaying, how long can President-elect Lai, dubbed “Chen 2.0,” endure before making a similar move?"
Nauru purposefully chose the second day of Mr. Lai’s election to announce the severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a particularly sensitive timing. It occurred during the visit of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Stenberg and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Chair Laura Rosenberger to Taiwan. Beijing deliberately pulled away Taiwan’s ally Nauru from the South Pacific, seemingly challenging the United States. Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu, who was on a visit to Latin America, reprimanded Nauru with extreme anger, even though he had previously advocated that "diplomatic ties are useless to Taiwan," which is merely an excuse to shirk responsibility. Taiwan has always dedicated resources to its diplomatic allies and denigrated them after the breakup. In hindsight, it raises the question: why did Taiwan re-establish diplomatic relations with Nauru in 2005, three years after capricious Nauru established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China?
Securing less than a majority vote for his presidency and facing a challenging minority representation in the three-party legislative yuan, the "double minority" President-elect Lai carefully delivered his speech, focusing on the teleprompter for precise wording on the night of his victory. Nevertheless, his speech on cross-strait relations did not convey goodwill towards Beijing. Instead, he expressed in a detached manner, stating that "exchange replaces isolation, dialogue replaces confrontation." Interestingly, between the lines, he referred to China's interference in the election, claiming to be fearless against China's verbal attacks and military intimidation, emphasizing a determination to safeguard Taiwan. It seems that he is intentionally blowing the whistle to bolster resilience and courage.
On the contrary, the Taiwan Affairs Office of mainland China’s State Council has reacted with a pronounced attitude of contempt towards Mr. Lai’s victory, stating that "the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot represent the mainstream public opinion on the island." Beijing has expressed its unwillingness to negotiate with Mr. Lai, ushering the cross-strait relations into a high-risk period even before his inauguration. Unlike the approach towards former President Chen, Beijing is not giving Mr. Lai an observation period of "listen to his words and observe his actions." Also, unlike the stance towards President Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing is unwilling to give Mr. Lai an opportunity to answer an "unfinished examination sheet."
After going through intense election campaigns, Mr. Lai has not clarified his foreign and cross-strait policies. American think tank experts have suggested the idea of "freezing DPP’s Taiwan independence party platform," but Mr. Lai and his team have yet to respond. Embracing President Tsai’s course and “four Commitments,” Mr. Lai has narrowed down to only one adherence of "mutual non-subordination of two governments across the Taiwan Strait." The "Four Adherences" include a perpetual commitment to a constitutional system of freedom and democracy, maintaining that the R.O.C. and P.R.C. are not subordinate to each other, insisting on sovereignty that cannot be violated or annexed, and asserting that the future of Taiwan under the R.O.C. must follow the will of all the people of Taiwan. Mr. Lai’s approach suggests a desire to tightly embrace the United States as a big brother.
President Joe Biden’s reflexive response to Taiwan's election that "We do not support (Taiwan) independence" may not be pertinent. However, it does provide some clear message on the American stance to Mr. Lai. Notably, before the election, Liu Jianchao, head of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, visited the United States, and the day after the election, the American delegation swiftly arrived in Taipei. These unusual and proactive diplomatic moves indicate a sense of caution and concern from the United States regarding the potential Taiwan Strait risks under Mr. Lai's presidency. The term "preventive diplomacy" is used to describe these actions, suggesting a proactive approach to address potential challenges that may arise in cross-strait relations during the next four years.
Regarding Nauru's severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Rosenberger emphasized "U.N. resolution 2758 did not make a determination on the status of Taiwan; does not preclude countries from having diplomatic relationships with Taiwan; and does not preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. system." The United States advocates for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community. While this presumably warms the hearts of the Taiwanese people, why doesn't the United States just establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan directly? Why not assist Taiwan in joining or returning to the United Nations? Even in the context of the "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade," why does the United States only present lofty ideas without providing Taiwan with substantial economic benefits?
Mr. Lai has stated that "the Republic of China is a myth" and "the Republic of China Constitution is a disaster" in the presidential debate. It is peculiar that the “Republic of China and its Constitution” are being utilized by Wang Yi, Director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to address the cross-strait relationship. In 2016, shortly after Tsai’s victory in the presidential election, Wang Yi, in a speech at a think tank in Washington, expressed the hope that Tsai would adhere to the R.O.C. Constitution. Now, Wang Yi is also referencing the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration. Ironically, it was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who signed the Cairo Declaration with British and American leaders, not the Chinese Communist Party.
The United States, in the Cairo Declaration, pledged to return Taiwan and the Pescadores to the R.O.C., which was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration. It is obvious that Beijing no longer considers Chiang Kai-shek and the R.O.C. as political taboos, and is engaging in a contest for the interpretation of history, portraying the P.R.C. as the legitimate successor to the R.O.C.
Over the past eight years, the Tsai administration has experienced the termination of diplomatic ties with 10 countries, leaving only 12 diplomatic allies. Taiwan has continued to be excluded from participating in international organizations such as the World Health Assembly, International Civil Aviation Organization, and Interpol. DPP administration efforts in foreign relations have been ineffective, with the New Southbound Policy fraught, one remaining ally in Africa (Eswatini), one in South America (Paraguay), and the relationship with the Holy See in Europe tottering. Foreign policy analysts initially anticipated Guatemala and Paraguay in Central America would potentially sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, unexpectedly, it is Nauru in the South Pacific. With the dwindling number of diplomatic allies, Taiwan’s opportunities for transit diplomacy are significantly reduced. The so-called "diplomatic achievements" in countries like Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Poland seem to have garnered only symbolic rather than substantive support.
When former President Chen took office in 2000, he repeatedly emphasized the "Four Noes and One Without" and tabled the "Integration theory," attempting to signal goodwill to China. However, after more than two years of listening to and observing Mr. Chen’s statements and actions, Beijing attained recognition from Nauru, leaving Mr. Chen infuriated and hastily introducing the "One Country on Each Side" concept. From then on, cross-strait relations rapidly deteriorated, and Tsai Ing-wen, then-minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, was compelled to rush to Washington to explain the situation.
Establishing diplomatic relations with Nauru is just Beijing's initial response to the Taiwan 2024 election results, and it will further react to Lai’s inauguration speech in the coming May and the U.S. presidential election at the end of this year. The Taiwan Strait will continue to be the stage of U.S.-China competition, and the concept of "U.S.-China Joint Governance of Taiwan" is gradually taking shape. Chen restrained himself for two years before revealing his true colors. How long Lai Ching-te can maintain President Tsai’s course remains to be observed. Beijing, on the other hand, must calculate carefully to avoid once again losing the hearts of the Taiwanese people.